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AN EISTORICAL SKETCH OF MILITARY LAW'
RIDLEY McLEAN .
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In my annual report, I have urged the appointment of a commit-
tee to secure a series of papers on important topics appropriate to
consideration and discussion by this society. I furthermore pointed
out the advantage of choosing these topics systematically with the
object of covering in the proceedings the broad subject of military
law, before branching off to an investigation and discussion of the
more intricate questions involving constitutional law and relations
with the judiciary :-questions which offer a broad field for our activ-
ities in the future. With this in mind I endeavored in my report to
set forth, subject to comment of our members, the different mean-
ings sometimes applied to the term Military Law. By the same token,
it seems pertinent to review in a very brief sketch the history of
military law.
We have seen that military law must be distinguished from mar-
tial law; that it is the code governing the discipline of a military
body in the service of the State; that it is the law administered 'by
the military power upon those in military service; that military courts
form no part of the judiciary and, except as to jurisdiction, that their
procedure is not subject to review by civil courts; and finally, that
they are courts for trial and punishment of violations of laws enacted
by Congress for the government of its military forces-courts created
in the Executive Branch of our Government by authority of that
clause of the Constitution which authorizes Congress to make rules
for the Government of the land and naval forces.
It is by virtue of this clause that Articles of War and the Arti-
cles for the Government of the Navy were enacted, and these "Arti-
cles" designate their own offenses, provide their own courts of adjudi-
cation, and prescribe their own punishments.
What is the history of this separation of .the military from the
civil? Despite their wisdom, how did the draftsmen of our Consti-
tion arrive at this feature so essential to military efficiency?
The answer is naturally, "From the English upon whom all of
our early instructions were based." True, but how did it arise with
the British? The early history of military law to those not already
familiar with it isi interesting, and, in that it gives an idea of the
fundamentals upon which military law is based, is highly instructive.
'Read at the annual meeting of the American Society of Military Law,
Chicago, August 30, 1916.2Late Judge Advocate-General of the United States Navy.
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It must be borne in mind that this sketch treats of military law in its
strict meaning, and it must not be confused with martial law, Military
Government, or the general laws relating to land or naval forces.
EARLY HISTORY.
In early times Great Britain was divided under the feudal sys-
tem into many fiefs, each of which furnished forces to the crown,
when required. Troops were thus raised for a particular service
and were disbanded upon the cessation of hostilities. There was no
permanent military force, or standing army; military forces existed
only in time of war, and these men were retainers of the Crown
rather than servants of the State.
The Crown, therefore, of its mere prerogative, made rules and
regulations for the government and discipline of its troops while thus
embodied and serving. These rules were known as Articles" of War.
In the reign of Henry VI the offense of desertion was made a
felony by statute. With this single exception, the Articles of War,
issued as above described upon the mere prerogative of the Crown,
remained practically the sole authority for the enforcement of disci-
pline up to 1689, when the first Mutiny Act was passed by Parliament.
This Act was necessitated by a mutiny (the details of which are
unnecessary here) with which the Crown by its meie prerogative
was unable to cope. Hence this Act defined and prescribed mutiny,
treason and the like, and conferred authority upon the Crown to
govern the Army under prescribed rules.
The. military forces of the Crown then for the first time were
brought under the direct and immediate control of the State. Even.
in time of Cromwell and Charles I, the then existing parliamentary
forces were governed not by act of legislation, but by Articles of
War similar to those issued by the King; these articles were author-
ized by an ordinance of the Lords and Commons which were in that
respect exercising the prerogatives hitherto exercised by the Crown.
The power of law. making by prerogative of the Crown was held
to be applicable during a state of war only, and attempts to exercise
it in time of peace were ineffectual. Subject to this limitation it
existed for considerably more than a century after the first mutiny
act.
FIRST MUTINY ACT TO 1803.
During this period the Mutiny Act was during certain years
suffered to expire, but a statutory power was given the Crown to
make Articles of War operative in the Colonies and elsewhere beyond
the seas at all times in the same manner as those heretofore made by
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prerogative had operated in time of war. This continued up to the
passage of the Mutiny Act in 1803, which effected a great constitu-
tional change.
FROM 1803 TO 1879.
With the Mutiny Act of 1803 the power of the Crown to make
any Articles of War became altogether statutory and the former
prerogative was merged in the Act of Parliament. Thus matters
remained until 1879, when the last Mutiny act was passed and the
last Articles of War promulgated. The Mutiny Act legislated for
offenses for which the sentence of death or penal servitude could be
awarded, and the Articles of War, though repeating the provisions
of the Mutiny Act, constituted the direct authority for dealing with
offenses for which imprisonment was the maximum punishment, as
well as numerous matters relating to details of trial and procedure.
In 1879 the Mutiny Act and the Articles were consolidated into
one harmonious act, and after two years experience with it, the authori-
ties having found it capable of improvement, this act was in turn
superseded in 1881 by the Army Act. This Act contains a proviso
saving to the Crown the former prerogative to make Articles of War,
but provides that such Articles shall not apply to any crime made
punishable by that Act. Inasmuch as the Army Act covers every
conceivable crime, this retaining of the ancient prerogative will be
seen to be an empty formality.
SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH MILITARY LAW.
From the above it will be seen that the development of Military
Law in England divides itself into three distinct periods-
(1) Prior to the first Mutiny Act (1689). During this period
the military forces were regarded as personal retainers of the sovereign
rather than servants of the State; they were governed by will of the
sovereign.
(2) 1689 to 1803. Army recognized as a permanent force.
Inside of realm governed by statute or by sovereign under authority
derived from and limited by statute;- outside (that is, in colonial pos-
sessions) by prerogative of Crown under authority of statute.
(3) 1803 to 1879. Governed directly by statute, or by sovereign
under an authority derived from and limited by statute.
(4) After 1879. Subsequent to this date the sovereign could
not make Articles of War, but he could prescribe rules of procedure
not inconsistent with law regulating the government and administra-
tion of the military forces. The statutes governing the land forces
are contained in the Army Act. This contains the Mutiny Act and
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Articles of War combined and harmonized, and is reenacted annually
because of a constitutional tradition that a permanent standing army
is contrary to the free institution of Great Britain, a clause in the
preamble reciting the illegality of the realm having a standing army
in time of peace except by consent of parliament.
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT.
From the above it will be seen that at the time of gaining our
independence, the Army of Great Britain was governed at home by
statute, in the Colonies by Articles of War issued by prerogative of
the Crown; therefore, it is but natural that, independence having been
gained through force of arms, strict articles governing the discipline
of the armed forces should ha~e been adopted; the new State having
been based upon republican ideas, it also followed that the gradual
growth of the Mother 'Country through centuries should have been
at once adopted and that the Articles of War be authorized entirely
by legislature. This system was accordingly adopted in the beginning;
Congress enacted the statutes known as Articles of War and has from
time to time modified them, leaving to the President as Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and Navy authority to prescribe regulations
for the armed forces not inconsistent with law. Thus in our very
cradle we adopted in effect the laws which England arrived at a
century later.
MILITARY LAW AS APPLIED TO THE NAVY.
The "Articles for the Government of the Navy" correspond in
the Navy to the Articles of War in the Army. Tracing back the his-
tory of these Articles, I have found that in 1749 in the reign of King
George II an act was passed amending prior acts relating to the sea
forces of the realm. In a very long preamble-it provides that numer-
ous prior acts, each of which is described at length by its title, "shall
be and the same are hereby repealed to all intents and purposes
whatsoever." The first and earliest of these acts mentioned as be-
ing repealed is "an act passed in the thirteenth year of the reign of
King Charles the Second entitled 'An act for establishing articles and
orders for the regulating and better government of his Majesty's
Navies, ships of war, and forces by sea.'
The date of the act referred to was some years earlier than the
first Mutiny Act, and as the title uses the words, "better govern-
ment," it would seem to indicate the existence of 'still earlier statutory
enactments concerning the sea forces, but of this I have been unable
to find a record. Certainly, therefore, as early as about 1650 the
Navy was governed by Articles enacted by the legislature.
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In America we find the Colonial Congress on November 28,
1775, passed Articles for the sea government of the United Colonies.
These articles bear a remarkable similarfty (as would be expected)
to the Articles of 1749, passed in the reign of King George II. These
articles of 1775 apparently governed until the first session of the
first congress, 1799, passed Articles for the Government of the United
States Navy. These were in turn superseded the following year by
an act entitled "Articles for the Better Government of the United
States Navy." These were extensively revised in 1862 and have
been subject to certain changes in individual articles from time to
time since that date, but no general revision has been enacted. The
present Articles therefore bear (especially in form) a surprising
resemblance to the Articles of 1749. Even the oath taken by mem-
bers of a court relative to not divulging the vote of a member is illus-
trative of the antiquity of many of our present customs.
SUMMARY.
From the above we see-
(1) That the Articles of War were in early times actually what
the name implied, viz., Articles for the Government and Discipline of
the Fighting Forces in Time of War, such forces being assembled
only in time of war. Being then regarded as personal retainers of
the King rather than as servants of the State, the King issued these
Articles as his prerogative.
(2) That gradually these conditions changed; fighting forces
were maintained in peace as well as in war; these forces began to
be recognized as servants of the State; the State began by enact-
ing laws fixing penalties for only the most serious offenses, and after
centuries of gradual change, only in recent years has the British
Army come to be governed entirely -by statutory enactment, the Crown
being merely allowed to make regulations for administration of these
forces.
(3) That in so far as the United States is concerned, each
branch of the military forces has from the birth of the State been
governed by its own Articles, modeled much after the parent coun-
try, enacted by legislature, enforced by military courts, and the Presi-
dent as-Commander-in-Chief is granted authority to make regula-
tions not inconsistent with law.
Thus it is seen that military law is a fundamental branch of the
national law, has the same foundation, and its rules, its extent, and
its limitations are as well defined as any other branch of the law
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administered by the federal government, though it forms no part of
the judicial branch thereof.
Military law extends its jurisdiction to every person- regularly
commissioned, appointed or enlisted in the organization in question,
in time of war to all offenses, and in time of peace to practically every
offense except murder committed within the United States. Though
an officer or man is in all respects subject to the provisions of civil
law, the sweeping jurisdiction of military courts, combined with the
exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal property, gives practically
to military courts in the United States a wider latitude and broader
jurisdiction than that which is accorded in Great Britain, but in time
of peace the civil law is recognized as supreme and military officers
must ever remember that they are responsible to and may be required
to render account in civil courts for their official acts which may be
in contravention of civil law.
